Turkey, which had close relations with the Bashar al-Assad government before the Syrian Civil War, provided open support to the anti-Assad uprisings along with the Western world, becoming a key player in the conflict.
Demonstrations that started in March 2011 spread across Syria by April 2011 and escalated into uprisings that got out of control due to external support. Although the Turkish government had close relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before the war, Turkey aligned with Western nations advocating for Assad’s removal. Turkey supported the opposition groups (excluding the Syrian Democratic Forces) in establishing a new government in Syria, one that was more politically and religiously aligned with Turkey.
The Western world and Turkey openly supported the opposition, leading to the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and established a government-in-exile, the ‘Syrian National Council,’ in Istanbul. Meanwhile, the Assad government has held its political power in the face of its Western and Turkish opposition, bolstered by both regional and international support from Iran, Russia and China.
Turkey's leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, openly called Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad a ‘Killer’ and ‘Terrorist’ during the Syrian Civil War. However, in recent years, Erdoğan has expressed his desire to meet with Assad, referring to him as ‘Mr. Assad’ on many political platforms. This shift has caused concerns of Turkish support in Syria, among opposition groups.
Turkey's change in its Syria policy has been gradual since 2022. That year, in reaction to the statements of the then-Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announcing talks with Syria, violent protests against Turkey broke out among opposition groups in Turkish-controlled territories in Syria. Armed anti-Turkish demonstrators chanting ‘No to peace with the murderer’ stoned military bases in Turkish-controlled areas.
In the last two years, Turkish decision-makers have repeatedly stated that talks with Bashar al-Assad might take place. Most recently, at a press conference following the NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Washington, Erdoğan's request for a meeting with Assad, calling him ‘Mr. Assad,’ has renewed protests among the opposition. In Turkish-controlled territories in Syria, mass demonstrations erupted, opposition groups burned Turkish flags and removed them from the police headquarters in the city of Mare. Erdoğan’s compulsion to express his desire to meet with Bashar al-Assad clearly demonstrates Turkey's revised Syria policy.
What is the Reason for Turkey's U-Turn in its Syria Policy?
Turkey’s leaders have stated that the main cause of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 was the Assad government, and that the cessation of the conflicts in Syria and a solution can only be achieved through political change. Initially, Turkey took the same position as the Western world, to remove Assad from power and openly supported the opposition forces following US President Obama’s 2012 declaration that ‘[Syria’s future] must not belong to a dictator who massacres his people’ at the 67th General Assembly of the United Nations. Turkey provided extensive support to opposition groups, to form a unified army against Assad and to set up a political interlocutor.
Turkey’s initial engagement with opposition Kurdish groups such as the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) was short-lived, the last publicly acknowledged meeting with the PYD occurred in 2014 Talks ended when Kurdish groups in Syria sought to protect the their regions from a possible attack, and to protect their local autonomous cantons. Thoroughly irate, Turkey's direct negotiations with PYD ceased, and declared PYD a terrorist organisation and the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Consequently, Turkey's alliances in Syria have primarily involved pro-Turkey Sunni Arab, Turkmen, and Islamist groups.
After 2014, the Western world, especially the US, closely cooperated with the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG, against radical terrorist groups such as al-Nusra and ISIS. The Free Syrian Army’s associations with radical factions (such as al-Nusra, Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Jaish as-Islam) has hindered its international support from Western and Arab nations. Assad upheld his prominence in the political arena with the support of Russia and Iran, and the formation of a de facto Kurdish autonomous region in Syria led to a change in Turkey's Syria policies after 2022.
Turkey's foreign policy decision-makers perceived the Western intervention as one-dimensional in its aim of overthrowing Assad. This would prove to be a misinterpretation, resulting in the bulk of Turkey’s Syria policies to be built on false foundations. In actuality, the aim was to establish a Kurdish autonomous region allied with the West, preparing Syria for a post-Assad era. This realisation led Turkey to shift its focus from overthrowing Assad to preventing the formation of a Kurdish autonomous region, now perceiving it as a national threat.
Although Turkey took sides in the Syrian Civil War with this approach, the conditions in Syria have changed. The Western world did not show a direct stance against Assad, but instead gathered its allied groups under one roof (the Syrian Democratic Forces), making them significant stakeholders in Syria. This created a de facto Kurdish autonomous region (Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria), while Assad remained steadily in power and backed by Russia and Iran. The rapprochement between the Assad administration and the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria compelled Turkey to alter its Syria policy.
Turkey's foreign policy, due to the new conjuncture in Syria, has shifted its priority to preventing the rapprochement between Assad and the Syrian Democratic Forces and the formation of an official autonomous administration in Syria, rather than supporting the anti-Assad opposition. This change in Turkey's policy, which has been clearly reflected in the public opinion since 2022, has caused serious disturbances among the groups forming the Free Syrian Army. In particular, some Islamist radical groups accuse Turkey of ‘abandoning the opposition’ and betrayal, demonstrating their reactions by burning Turkish flags. These groups are firmly against a possible normalisation between Ankara and Damascus.
However, the pro-Turkey Sunni Arab and Turkmen groups, which form the basis of the opposition, did not participate in the anti-Turkey incidents in order to prevent the reactions from escalating. However, the split within the Free Syrian Army remains significant. The main reason for this divergence among the opposition is Turkey's new approach in its Syria policy. Turkey now considers the formation of an official autonomous administration in Syria as a more dangerous national threat than the Assad regime, which it has tried to overthrow for nearly 13 years. The change in Turkey's priorities is likely to cause violent protest and internal discord within the Free Syrian Army, leading to the emergence of smaller factions with limited influence.
Image: Office of the President of Russia
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