The Future of Syria: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Kurds and Türkiye in the New Syria
Updated: 2 days ago
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is now indubitably entrenched as the unlikely victor of the Syrian Civil War. Formerly known as the Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, the group has restructured itself over time, taking the name HTS and becoming part of a broader coalition against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, who came to power with the revolution, has been trying to distance himself from the group’s radical past and adopt a more moderate Islamist discourse. This conversion is far from winning over the international community.
During the Civil War, the Kurds established a self-governing region called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), known as Rojava. This region, which makes up about 25% of Syria, is governed by the principles of secularism, feminism, democracy and multi-ethnic cooperation. However, this autonomy is under significant threat from Türkiye, which sees the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as extensions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Türkiye designates as a terrorist organisation.
Türkiye has organised multiple military operations against Kurdish-held areas, aiming to dismantle the AANES and establish a "buffer zone" along its southern border, as it views an autonomous Kurdish state as a national security threat. The new Syrian administration, backed by Türkiye, has demanded that the SDF disarm and integrate into a national military force, a condition the Kurds have so far rejected. The fall of Bashar al-Assad has led to negotiations between the Kurdish-led SDF and the new Syrian Interim Government led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani has called for dialogue, described the Kurds as “an inseparable part of Syria” and stated that he would protect the rights of the Kurds. Despite HTS’s rhetoric regarding the Kurds, SDF leaders remain skeptical. The Kurds in Syria are strongly voicing their demand for self-government after years of oppression and deprivation of rights. The most important reason why the Kurds want to establish their own self-government and ensure their own security here is to prevent the atrocities committed by Assad and ISIS against the Kurds and other minorities in Syria from happening again.
The Kurds demand the preservation of their cultural and linguistic rights, including the ability to teach the Kurdish language in schools and celebrate Kurdish traditions like Nowruz. The Kurds advocate for a decentralised Syrian State that allows them to manage their local affairs while remaining part of a unified Syria. They reject full autonomy akin to Iraqi Kurdistan but seek constitutional recognition of their rights. The SDF insists on retaining its military structure to defend against threats from Türkiye and residual ISIS forces. They have called for international support, particularly from the U.S., to maintain a presence in Syria to ensure stability. The Kurds also demand a seat at the table in negotiations over Syria’s future. They have been excluded from previous talks due to Turkish opposition but are now engaging in discussions with Damascus, facilitated by international mediators.
Türkiye has been a central actor in the Syrian conflict since its inception. Initially, Ankara supported opposition groups fighting to overthrow the Assad regime. However, over time, Türkiye’s focus shifted to countering Kurdish influence in northern Syria, which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group it designates as a terrorist organisation. Türkiye has conducted several military operations in northern Syria, establishing a “safe zone” along its border. The Kurdish people in Kurd regions such as Afrin and Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) were expelled for security reasons or migrated from these regions of their own volition because they thought their lives were in danger.
Türkiye has two main goals regarding the future of Syria. The first and most important of these for Türkiye is to prevent a Kurdish Autonomy in Northern Syria. The first reason for this is to counter the influence of the YPG, which Türkiye sees as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which it defines as a terrorist organization, in Northern Syria and to prevent threats that may come from there. Another reason is that Türkiye is concerned Kurdish autonomy in Syria will inspire separatist movements within its own borders. Türkiye's second goal is to be a partner in the Syrian administration and its future and to be in a decision-making position in this key to the Middle East with deep historical ties with it. Türkiye has been cooperating with HTS since before it came to power, and has been the biggest supporter of HTS's rule in Syria after the revolution. Türkiye wants a Sunni Arab government that looks upon Türkiye positively so that it does not fall under the influence of an Iranian-backed Shiite Alawite Arabs in Syria again. For these reasons, it supports the Government established by HTS without taking HTS's Al Qaeda and ISIS roots into consideration. Türkiye has included the Free Syrian Army, which it has established and supported, in the New Syrian Army established by HTS, and has both provided military support to HTS in the field and ensured that there are pro-Türkiye groups in the New Syrian Army. Türkiye's moves are an attempt to keep Syria's future under control so that Türkiye can feel entirely unthreatened.
The situation of the Kurds in post-Assad Syria is complex and fraught with challenges, as they navigate a shifting political landscape while striving to preserve their cultural and political gains. Their demands for decentralisation, security guarantees, and inclusion in political dialogue are critical to achieving a stable and inclusive Syria, but could well destabilise their aforementioned gains. Türkiye’s opposition and the uncertain stance of international actors like the U.S. and the U.K pose significant challenges. Failure to address Kurdish demands could lead to further conflict, undermining efforts to build a stable and inclusive Syria. The Kurdish issue therefore will remain a central issue in Syria’s post-war reconstruction.
The future of Syria depends on how the relations between HTS, Türkiye and the Kurds take shape. HTS’s calls to the Kurds, their demands and Türkiye's influence in the region are critical to whether a lasting peace can be achieved in Syria. Granting political and cultural rights to ethnic and religious minorities in the New Syria will bring social peace within the country. Giving political and cultural rights to ethnic and religious minorities such as Kurds, Druze, Alawites and Christian minorities and allowing them to form their own local governments is not a division in Syria but an integration for the country. The most appropriate system for the integration of the Syrian people is a state system with strong local governments. The preservation of a secular, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural structure in Syria and the establishment of a democratic and decentralised system is seen as the most promising scenario for the future of the country. However, achieving this goal can only be possible if all parties adopt a conciliatory attitude and with the support of the international community. However, the lack of trust between the parties and their conflicting interests make it difficult for Syria to stabilise.
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