The Alternative to the Alternative: Party Politics and the Future of Germany

Germany’s federal election on February 23 reshaped its political landscape. With mainstream parties facing mounting challenges and the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) securing second place, the country’s political dynamics are undergoing a profound transformation. This election was not merely a contest over policies—it was a case study in how political leaders do more than respond to voter preferences; they actively shape them.

Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) introduced the centre-seeking strategy, which posits that voter preferences follow a bell curve, with most clustered around the median voter. To maximise electoral success, Downs argued, parties should align their policies as closely as possible with this centre. This strategy has been employed by numerous parties across the globe, often with significant success—but not without consequences.

One prominent example is Tony Blair’s transformation of the UK Labour Party in the 1990s. By shifting Labour toward the political center and embracing neoliberal policies, Blair’s “New Labour” secured three consecutive election victories. Similarly, in Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) adopted a Five-Point Plan aimed at addressing voter concerns on immigration and national security. This plan, which includes stricter border controls and expedited deportation processes, reflects the CDU’s attempt to recapture voters drifting toward the AfD.

Center-seeking strategies can help parties win elections but often at the cost of legitimising and amplifying the narratives of more extreme forces. As Archer (2011) notes, such an approach risks shifting public opinion further to the right, as mainstream parties inadvertently normalise once-fringe ideas. But the implications go even deeper. Political leaders actively shape voter preferences.

The AfD is not merely advocating for right-wing policies—it is fostering a nationalist political identity. Party systems are not just platforms for pre-existing group identities; they are spaces where identities are produced and mobilized (Proctor, 2019). Proctor’s research on the U.S. Republican Party shows how its alignment with the Christian Right pushed LGBT activists towards the Democratic Party, constructing a new political constituency.

A similar process is unfolding in Germany. The AfD’s rhetoric frames ethnic Germans as victims of an elite that prioritises migrants over native citizens. By normalising extreme positions on immigration, nationalism, and Euroscepticism, the AfD is not merely capturing right-wing voters—it is creating a new kind of nationalist voter, one who views politics as a cultural struggle. In doing so, it has pulled the CDU along with it.

Die Linke (The Left) is taking a markedly different approach. To understand its strategy, it is essential to introduce the concept of preference shaping. Instead of merely responding to existing voter preferences, parties seek to shape and redefine them. This strategy involves crafting compelling narratives, introducing new issues into public discourse, and reframing debates to shift the political Overton window (Mouffe and Laclau, 1985). 

Under the leadership of Jan van Aken and Heidi Reichinnek, Die Linke’s approach exemplifies preference shaping in action. Rather than diluting its policies to appeal to the median voter, the party has doubled down on its commitment to progressive values. Its unwavering pro-immigration stance, advocacy for economic redistribution, and support for unrestricted asylum rights are not just policy positions—they are part of a broader effort to redefine what it means to be a left-wing voter in Germany. 

This strategy has resonated particularly with younger voters and those disillusioned with the centrist drift of traditional parties. Die Linke’s bold positioning led to increased social media traction and a surge in party membership. Campaign polls indicated a rise in support from 3% to 7%, with the party eventually garnering upwards of four million votes (8.77%). This approach has been vindicated in the face of leftist divisions and the rising tide of nationalism. The 2025 German election was clearly not merely a contest over policies, migration debates, or shifting the median voter. It was a contest fought over the construction of voter identities—and a case study in what political parties can achieve when they seek to shape, rather than follow, public opinion.

Politicians wield influence beyond shaping preferences—they shape people’s political selves, bringing with them entire constellations of beliefs and priorities. Labour and the CDU may hold power, but their true impact lies in how they construct voter identities. In the long run, defining who voters believe they are may be more consequential than simply winning elections.

The German election can only be understood, therefore, by going beyond results and investigating the manner in which it reshaped the political landscape. At the heart of this transformation is leadership—not just in the conventional sense of messaging but in the deeper capacity to channel political energy and reshape how people see themselves and their role in society. German sociologist Max Weber described Besonnenheit—measured judgment or composure—as the hallmark of a leader capable of navigating complex political landscapes without succumbing to ideological fervor or populist reactions. In an era increasingly defined by extremes, this quality—more than charisma—may ultimately determine Germany’s political future.

Image: Flickr/Die Linke (Martin Heinlein)

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