Sandu's European Gamble Ends in Pyrrhic Victory
Moldova’s referendum on enshrining its determination to join the European Union within its constitution was always set to be a tightly contested affair. No-one could have predicted quite how close the final result would be. In a knife-edge margin of under a percent, the “Yes” vote emerged victorious early Monday (21 October) morning, 50.4% to 49.6%, by a mere few thousand votes. This is far from the resplendent endorsement of European integration that President Maia Sandu’s government not only expected, but needed.
Sandu and her government have banged the drum of promoting a pro-EU path for the last four years, pushing to finally escape Moscow’s grasp of coercive influence. Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the future of Moldova has been under intense scrutiny, compounded by the contingent of Russian soldiers stationed in the pro-Russian separatist state of Transnistria, on Moldova’s eastern border, and the increasingly separatist rhetoric of the autonomous pro-Russian region of Gagauzia.
In the run-up to the referendum, that was held simultaneously with the presidential election, authorities in Chisinau had warned of an “unprecedented onslaught” of electoral interference and vote-buying. Despite the exceedingly tight victory, Sandu was quick to decry the alleged interference of Russia in the votes. “Criminal groups…have attacked our country with [illegal funds], lies, and propaganda, using the most disgraceful means to keep our…nation trapped in uncertainty and instability” derided Sandu early Monday morning. Brussels defended Sandu, stating that Moldova had been subjected to extraordinary “intimidation and foreign interference” by Moscow in the run-up to Sunday’s vote.
In response, the Kremlin denounced the Moldovan referendum as “unfree”, centring on what Moscow saw as a “hard-to-explain” last-minute proliferation of votes in favour of Sandu and the EU, which it argued showed instances of meddling. Valeriu Pasha, a political analyst at WatchDog, a pro-democracy Moldovan think tank, suggested that the “Yes” vote, which had been behind 45% to 55% for the majority of the vote counting process, had “edged ahead only because of unusually high turnout among Moldovans living abroad”, many of whom support EU integration. It appears, therefore, that a slim majority of Moldovans residing in Moldova itself, opposed the constitutional enshrining of European integration.
I warned last Thursday that both sides must err on the side of caution when it comes to contesting or dismissing the election results. Trust in democratic institutions in Moldova is perilously low - with Brussels and Chisinau accusing Moscow of electoral interference, and vice versa, it is plausible that many Moldovans will feel a further erosion of their confidence and faith in their own democracy. With the margin of victory razor-thin, and turnout barely over 50%, the legitimacy of such a monumental constitutional amendment is in question.
In the autonomous region of Gagauzia, the rejection of European integration was almost universal. 95% of the Gagauzian population emphatically voted against the constitutional enshrinement. This correlates with the Gagauzian authorities announcement prior to the election of its “unwillingness to integrate into the European Union”, which they suggest would provide the region with the justification to exercise its right to self-determination, a move that could see the creation of Moldova’s second pro-Russian separatist state.
For Transnistria, the results were less clear-cut. Whilst 63% of those Transnistrians who voted rejected the pro-EU motion, many residents did not vote at all. Tiraspol’s refusal to provide state-sponsored transit to polling stations on the right-bank of the Dniester, likely influenced by a fear of some pro-EU support amongst its civilians, dramatically impacted turnout, compared with the relatively high Transnistrian turnout in the 2016 Moldovan presidential election. Those Transnistrians who headed to the polls corroborated “an unusually low turnout.” What is concerning, however, is the calls amongst some Ukrainian circles for the military ‘liberation’ of Transnistria in the wake of the referendum results, a move that would undoubtedly destabilise Moldova to the point of existential crisis were it to occur.
The presidential election had not been the resounding success for Sandu that many assumed, either. Whilst Sandu achieved roughly what opinion pollsters had predicted - 42% of the vote - the most surprising outcome was the 26% achieved by Alexandr Stoianoglo, the candidate for the Russian-backed Party of Socialists. Polls suggested that Stoianoglo would fail to even attain 10% of the popular vote.
If we combine the vote share of Stoianoglo with Renato Usatii, the candidate of the pro-Russian populist Partidul Nostru, and Irina Vlah, the former leader of Gagauzia, the total surpasses 45%. This places Sandu in an uncomfortable position, forced to face a second-round vote on 3 November. If Usatii and Vlah throw their support behind Stoianoglo, it is not unreasonable to suggest Sandu may be denied a second term. History is against Sandu; only one Moldovan president has ever successfully secured a second term in office - the Communist Party’s Vladimir Voronin in 2005.
The margin of victory, the relatively low level of turnout, the diaspora vote surge, and the accusations of electoral meddling from both sides, all raise important questions. Is this binding referendum legitimate enough to mandate such a consequential, constitutional change in Moldova’s political and cultural trajectory? Only a few thousand votes, from expatriates in diaspora communities, has swayed the election, seemingly against what the majority, however slim, of resident Moldovans voted for. Is it right that those who are not directly impacted by the outcome can sway such a seismic shift in direction for Moldova?
It is difficult to reconcile that those who are less affected by the immediate outcomes, of which could be significant given Russia’s propensity to act aggressively to keep states within its sphere of influence, have been able to have such a decisive impact on the decision.
The accusations of electoral meddling from both sides further complicates an already complex situation. With Sandu’s pro-EU government blaming Moscow for attempting to sabotage the referendum, Moscow has criticised the handling of diaspora voting and accused Chisinau of disenfranchising Moldovans in Russia by printing insufficient numbers of ballots. Debate will undoubtedly emerge as to whether the results truly reflect the will of the Moldovan people, and whether instituting such significant constitutional change immediately, on the basis of such a contested, unclear result, is the best course of action.
Maia Sandu’s gamble to secure Moldova’s path towards European integration has resulted in a Pyrrhic victory. Whilst the pro-EU “Yes” vote has won the referendum, the narrowness of such a margin, coupled with the complex, obfuscated circumstances behind the vote, has left the country deeply polarised and divided. The divisiveness of the referendum, exacerbated by accusations of interference, the razor-thin majority, the issue of Transnistrian and Gagauzian separatism, leaves Moldova in an arguably more precarious position than prior to the vote.
Far from being the definitive expression of Moldova’s European trajectory and a rejection of Moscow’s grasp, it seems that Sandu has attained victory in name only. Though Moldova has narrowly chosen its future path, the fragility of this victory underscores the deep divisions within the nation, leaving Sandu’s government to navigate not only the external threats from Moscow, but also the enduring internal divisions that this referendum has brought to the fore.
Image: USAID/Flickr
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