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Writer's pictureGeorge Wallace

Russia’s Syrian Retreat: A Strategic Opportunity that the Incoming Trump Administration Must Capitalise on in Ukraine


At the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris in early December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, French President Emmanuel Macron, and the incoming 47th President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, unexpectedly convened for a meeting. Given Trump’s prior reservations about the Ukrainian President and his cause, the meeting seemed to have gone quite well, with the three sharing a warm handshake in front of the press afterward. A campaign is evidently underway to shift the perspective of the incoming US President, who once cynically referred to Zelenskyy as “the greatest salesman of any politician that’s ever lived.”


Perhaps, though, investing in Ukraine should be becoming increasingly appealing to Trump, with Russia starting to show cracks across the world stage as it continues to pile into its invasion of Ukraine. 


Over the past few weeks, these cracks have widened into fissures, with Syria unexpectedly emerging as the focal point of the Kremlin’s troubles.


Putin had been instrumental in supporting Bashar al-Assad’s brutal dictatorship. Reportedly, the Kremlin spent $464 million on its intervention in Syria in the first six months of its operation in 2015. This support continued through the last decade, seemingly growing. By 2018, the Russian Defence Ministry reported that more than 63,000 Russian personnel had been deployed to Syria since it commenced operations in September 2015. The Russian Air Force alone reported over 39,000 sorties against opposition factions. With Russia’s help, Assad held approximately 65-70% of Syria by 2020, remaining relatively secure through the last few years.


But on 26 November 2024, the situation flipped on its head.


Syria’s opposition militias launched an unprecedented offensive against Assad. The war in Syria had been drawing close to its fourteenth anniversary. Yet, within twelve days of the offensive starting, the rebels had seized the capital, Damascus, with no opposition.


Those watching events during that time were certainly expecting at least some kind of Russian response to support the ailing Assad. And yet, apart from some extremely limited airstrikes, there was nothing.


Later in the week, Russia bowed out of Syria with a whimper, commencing frantic withdrawals from its major air and naval bases in Western Syria, with the Kremlin now in hasty negotiations with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group forming the new regime, over their security. Assad was also granted asylum in Moscow, marking a clear end to his twenty-four-year tenure as Syrian leader. 


On the surface, this is a major problem for Russia, presenting an immediate threat to the Kremlin in the Middle East. Under the surface, though, there lurks a more serious issue. 


The naval base in Tartus provided both an important warm-water port and access to the Mediterranean, which Russia desperately lacked. Vessels leaving its Black Sea ports in Crimea and Novorossiysk are under threat of Ukrainian attacks, and Russian warships are also prevented from traversing the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention. The Khmeimim Airbase, meanwhile, has been an important strategic asset for Russia’s operations in Africa.


So, with the negative implications of Russia’s situation in Syria, why should Trump now be looking at Ukraine with a little more strategy? 


The answer is simple enough: weakness. 


Russia did not respond to the attack by rebel forces in Syria, not because it wouldn’t, but because it couldn’t. The Kremlin is too stretched and could not manage propping up Assad without risking its positions elsewhere. Thus, it was forced to watch its hold on Syria disintegrate.


Now, therefore, is the time for Trump to commit to Ukraine. It is not often that your long-term opponent on the world stage backs themselves into a tricky corner and humiliates itself so publicly. The tells have been there for months across Russia’s political, economic, and military actions: for instance, the Russian Ruble has hovered around 100 to the US dollar for over a month—a level it last reached at the very beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and which had not been seen at any point during Putin's tenure since 2000. But this blunder is the clearest sign yet.


With Ukraine stoutly holding its ground, the US has every reason to follow suit. The Biden administration’s policy of supplying Ukraine with the weapons it needs to maintain its ability to fight has not led to major escalations, and Zelenskyy himself does not ask for more than financial and equipment support. Furthermore, with Putin unlikely to accept any kind of reasonable peace deal brokered by the US, ceasing support in the hope of achieving an agreement is incredibly risky. This would simply allow Putin an opportunity to achieve his goals, a foreign policy disaster. 


This is, of course, a very cynical perspective. Taking such a stance is almost inhumane to the Ukrainian people, given that they have already sacrificed so much in resisting Russian aggression. However, Trump is cynical by nature. So he is unlikely to support Ukraine with huge amounts of aid if there isn’t something in it for the US. Therefore, the humanity that typically justifies supporting Zelenskyy has to be set aside, and reason must be found to demonstrate that this cause is worthwhile for Washington.


Thus, recognition that there is a reward in this conflict for the US’s power and influence is important, which was further clarified by Russia’s Syria debacle. The opportunity to continue to wear down a major opponent, particularly in their weakened state, is not something that Trump should ignore.






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