Following the assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran, an entirely new threat assessment is required for the already high-risk security dynamics in the Middle East. Haniyeh, the face of international diplomacy for Hamas, was killed in the Iranian capital by an Israeli strike in the early hours of 31 July. Despite not claiming responsibility publicly, Israel reportedly informed US officials immediately after the assassination that it was responsible. Tens of thousands took the streets in Sanaa, Yemen to protest the assassination, accompanying the immense protests in the Yemeni capital’s al-Sabeen Square that have been taking place on a weekly basis. These scenes are a good indicator of the vitriol and animosity toward Israel and the West that currently permeates the Arab world.
Outside of the extensive civilian casualties resulting from Israel’s operations in Gaza, it is the brazen assassinations of high ranking Hamas and Hezbollah figures that have exacerbated tensions across the region. The 13 July assassination of Mohammed Deif, Commander of Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, in the Khan Younis area of Gaza Strip preceded Haniyeh’s demise. Then, following the 27 July Hezbollah attack on a soccer field in Majdal Shams, a town in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, Israel struck the Lebanese capital of Beirut, killing Fuad Shukr, a top Commander and founding member of Hezbollah on 30 July.
This constitutes what venerated US journalist Seymour Hersh has described as an “assassination spree” by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Considering that Haniyeh was leading Hamas’s ceasefire negotiations, his death has essentially ended the possibility of a ceasefire in the near future. It has long been speculated that atrophied ceasefire talks were the goal of Netanyahu, who has propped up Hamas for years in order to delegitimize the Palestinian pursuit of a diplomatic resolution. “Hamas, which was financed for years by Qatar, at Netanyahu’s behest, is far from defeated and it is now clear that Netanyahu has been the one resisting a ceasefire there, despite pressure—or rather, pleading—from the Biden White House” Hersh writes. The lack of a clear endgame for the war in Gaza has been a consistent criticism of Netanyahu’s regime, with recent decisions indicating that he may be going rogue and risking a regional war as a strategy, especially with allies like the UK dropping their challenge to the ICC’s arrest warrant for Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
Israel has also conducted numerous airstrikes in the Syrian capital of Damascus in 2024, one of which destroyed the Iranian consulate in April, sparking the largest escalation since 7 October 2023, until late July’s developments. The death of Haniyeh and Shukr, both of which occurred on the sovereign soil of Iran and Lebanon, respectively, are significant escalations on the current security landscape. While Iran’s response timeline is still unclear, it is believed to be imminent, and it is likely to be extensive. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has promised “harsh punishment” for Israel following Haniyeh’s death.
A variety of developments over the past month have been leading to this inflection point, including the IDF airstrike which destroyed the Al-Hudaydah port in Yemen on 20 July. This is a critical piece of infrastructure for Houthi logistics, but nonetheless is far more important for receiving aid to support the impoverished people of northern Yemen. Wide ranging humanitarian consequences are expected from this development, more so than stifled Houthi operations.
Operation Prosperity Guardian, the US-led coalition response to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea, has included US-UK airstrikes hitting Yemen various times throughout 2024 as well. These attacks contribute to the galvanization of Iran and its proxies across the region. When President Biden ordered airstrikes on Yemen in January, it was the first time the US directly attacked the Houthis and it was the first airstrike by any country on Yemen in more than two years. Just two weeks later, US airstrikes in Iraq and Syria again risked escalation. These came in response to over 150 attacks against US troops in Iraq and Syria by Iran-aligned militants in the months following 7 October. On August 5th, Iran-backed militias attacked a US military base in response to this renewed Israeli aggression, injuring five US troops and two contractors.
This begs two questions: 1) Why does the US still have troops in both Iraq and Syria in 2024, after their intervention in both cases has led to the further destabilization of both states and exacerbated humanitarian crises, and 2) How will the US respond this time around?
Washington has now sent additional Navy warships and fighter jets to the Middle East to bolster security for Israel. It was also reported on August 7 that US airstrikes targeted Iran-backed militant positions west of the Euphrates River in Deir Ezzor Governorate, Syria. The US’ unconditional support for Israel has always been the primary deterrent to Iran launching full-scale attacks against Tel-Aviv.
However, this is not the same geopolitical landscape as 2003, and the likelihood of an all-out regional war has reached new heights. Whether this broader conflict officially breaks out is contingent upon the scale of Iran’s response. Netanyahu is aware that the US will follow him into the abyss, as that is the nature of US-Israeli relations, and he has long understood the power that Israeli politics and foreign policy initiatives have in Washington. Netanyahu famously said in 2001,"I know what America is. America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction.”
Considering the risks taken to assassinate foreign leaders on the sovereign soil of Israel’s regional adversaries, Netanyahu’s willingness to draw the US into a regional war is clear. While the US’ own standing in international politics is diminishing due to years of failed interventionism, crippling economic sanctions against enemies which have posed long-term risks, and a more unified Global South, this could be a devastating blow to US hegemony. The US cannot afford to extend themselves across three security conflicts.
As the US continues its efforts to contain China in the Indo-Pacific, commit resources to combatting Russia in Ukraine, and prepare to support Israel in a war against Iran and its allies, the US grand strategy seems incoherent, if not entirely delusional. One of these security conflicts must be solved with diplomacy as opposed to military conflagration and economic warfare. A security conflict on three fronts is a catastrophic foreign policy framework to pursue, and it will erode whatever standing the US has left in the eyes of the international community.
Image: Wikimedia Commons/SDudley (Office of Speaker Mike Johnson)
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