Is Moscow preparing to thaw the Transnistrian frozen conflict?

Amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine and rising tensions across Europe, Transnistria, a Russian-allied separatist region of Moldova, has emerged as a potential flashpoint in Russia’s geopolitical manoeuvring. Recent allegations from Moscow accusing Moldova of planning a military incursion into Transnistria have triggered fears of impending conflict. Analysts warn that these accusations could signal a “false flag” operation by the Kremlin, aiming to destabilise Moldova, obstruct its European integration aspirations, and reaffirm Russia’s coercive influence in the region.

The potential for escalation is stark. Russia’s strategy of exploiting frozen conflicts in post-Soviet states is a staple of its commitment to maintaining regional dominance. As Moldova balances its pro-Western leadership and European aspirations with its historical ties to Russia, the question arises: is Moscow about to thaw the Transnistrian frozen conflict, upending its fragile stability, to further its broader geopolitical objectives?

Transnistria: A Strategic Fault Line

Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, is a Russian-backed separatist region, positioned between the left bank of the Dniester River and the Ukrainian border. The region broke away from Moldova in 1990. Since 1992, Transnistria has existed in a frozen conflict, that is peace without settlement, with the ceasefire holding without resolution over the political status of the territory. Crucially, although its sovereignty is unrecognised internationally, Transnistria aligns politically and militarily with Russia. 

Transnistria hosts approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers, as well as the Cobasna ammunition depot, a major Soviet-era weapons storage facility owned by Russia. The region’s authorities have consistently aligned themselves with Moscow, appealing for Russian protection in February 2024. These appeals mirror those seen in Crimea and the Donbas, raising concerns that Transnistria might follow a similar trajectory towards annexation or heightened conflict. 

Presently, Transnistria is central to Moldova’s energy security. Moldova receives approximately 2 billion cubic metres of gas from Russia annually, of which, since 2022, all gas is received through Transnistria. Electricity is sold to Moldova from Transnistria, generated using Russian gas. However, the gas transits through Ukraine, with Kyiv refusing to extend the transit agreement past 1 January 2025. Sandu has accused Russian state-controlled Gazprom of refusing to consider utilisation of an alternative pipeline, and has tried to prepare Moldova for a “harsh winter." For Transnistria and its regime, the impending energy crisis is existential. 

Kremlin Allegations

On 23 December, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service accused Moldovan President Maia Sandu of planning a military operation in Transnistria which Russian intelligence speculated could escalate into a war. Andrian Balutel, Sandu’s chief of staff, was quick to refute the claims, insisting that Chisinau had no intention or plans to militarily enter Transnistria, despite the territory being internationally recognised as part of Moldova. 

On 25 December, Russia made a further allegation. Maria Zakharova, the Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman, said that Moscow believed that NATO had transferred significant weaponry into Moldova in recent months, intended for usage in Ukraine. Zakharova cited Sandu’s pro-Western allegiances to corroborate her claims. This aligns with the shifting rhetoric of Russian President Vladimir Putin. In recent months, Putin has increasingly stated that countries that help Ukraine in its war against Moscow risk being identified and treated by the Kremlin as enemies that it might launch military attacks upon. 

The latest allegations from the Kremlin, as argued by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), could be part of a wider strategy to disrupt Moldova’s accession into the European Union, by destabilising it, thus leaving Moldova vulnerable to Russia’s coercive influence. The Kremlin, as the ISW cautioned in a report, could be setting the conditions for “a false flag operation in Transnistria.” 

The Russian intelligence reports suggest Sandu called on the Chisinau government to develop a plan to establish control over Transnistria and eliminate the Russian military presence at a meeting with Moldova’s energy security leadership. Russian milbloggers further insinuated that Sandu is planning to attack Transnistria in retaliation for Russia stopping its gas transit via Ukraine, identifying that the possible locale for the false flag attack is the Cuciurgan power station. Balutel dismissed the claims as “serious and dangerous disinformation, designed to sow panic and distrust.” 

A Real Threat?

The likelihood of war between Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia hinges on a delicate balance of strategic calculations, resource constraints, and political dynamics. On the one hand, Moscow might view escalation as a means to destabilise Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, as a means to keep Chisinau within its coercive sphere of influence. With Russian troops and a significant ammunition depot already stationed in Transnistria, the separatist region provides a convenient platform for hybrid warfare or even direct military action. 

Additionally, a false flag operation, such as an attack on critical infrastructure like the Cuciurgan power station, could provide the Kremlin with a pretext for military intervention. These tactics align with Russia’s historical approach of exploiting frozen conflicts to maintain influence and coercive control in the region. 

However, several factors reduce the likelihood of outright war. Russia’s military remains overextended in Ukraine, and opening a second front could strain its resources. Moldova, under President Maia Sandu, has also shown restraint, firmly denying any plans for military action in Transnistria. This measured approach, combined with international scrutiny, may act as a deterrent against direct Russian aggression. Furthermore, Transnistria itself benefits from economic ties with Moldova and the EU, with some 80 per cent of Transnistrian exports delivered to the EU and its leadership might hesitate to fully embrace a conflict that risks destabilising the region’s fragile economy and its very existence.

The more plausible scenario involves Russia continuing its hybrid warfare strategy to destabilise Moldova without committing to a full-scale military confrontation. Disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, and strategic provocations have already created uncertainty, with Moscow leveraging Moldova’s energy crisis to sow panic and undermine trust in Sandu’s government. This approach reflects a calculated effort to weaken Moldova’s resolve and stall its European integration while avoiding the unpredictable costs of open warfare. 

Nonetheless, the situation remains volatile, and the risk of escalation, whether intentional or through miscalculation, cannot be dismissed. Moldova and its allies must carefully navigate this precarious landscape to prevent further destabilisation.

Image: Karen Grigorean/Unsplash

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