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Writer's pictureLuke Goddard

Is conflict between China and Taiwan inevitable?



The 2024 Taiwanese election marked an important moment in Taiwan-China relations. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won an unprecedented third presidential term, becoming the first Taiwanese party to do so since democratisation in the 1990s.


DPP is closely associated with the Taiwanese independence movement. They oppose reunification with mainland China and vehemently assert the principle of Taiwanese sovereignty. 


The recent inauguration of the new president Lai Ching-te reaffirmed the DPP’s stance. Lai was clear that the future of Taiwan would be determined by its 23 million people, declaring that “Taiwan is already an independent sovereign country”.


Understanding the precise nature of Taiwanese sovereignty as conceived by its politicians is difficult. Quite frankly it’s impossible. Taiwanese leaders will, in the same breath, make grand declarations of sovereignty whilst stressing they have no wishes or plans to declare independence. Makes sense, right? 


Nevertheless, this irrational status quo has acted as a vital safeguard against Chinese aggression. The pantomimesque ‘are they aren’t they’ discourse surrounding independence has obscured the actual conditions required for sovereignty and helped reduce tensions with China.


Any formal declaration of Taiwanese independence is a red line for China, one that would most likely be met with a military response. President Xi Jinping has openly stated that although a peaceful “winning over hearts and minds” strategy is his preferred reunification policy, he does not rule out the use of force in retaking the island. 


In fact, Xi has rather boxed himself in. He views the island as a breakaway province and the reunification policy is essential to his 2049 vision for China to regain great power status. Reunification has become such a vital pillar of Communist Party policy that its achievement is now intrinsically linked to the CCP’s credibility. 


Given the impending (2049) deadline for completion, and the approach of Chinese officials being a purportedly peaceful one, Xi must have been hoping for a more sympathetic leader across the Taiwan Strait. One at least amenable to closer Taiwan-China relations. Someone who Xi could have coerced into accepting the ‘one country two systems’ formula that has proven so useful in amalgamating Hong-Kong.


Alas, Lai Ching-te is not that person. A self-described “practical worker for Taiwan independence”,  he represents the antithesis of Xi’s vision for a unified China. But it’s clear that the new Taiwanese president is symptomatic of a much broader and important social trend.


Support for reunification fell to a low of 1.1% among the Taiwanese people in 2023 with 72.5% of the population saying they would take up arms to fend off a Chinese invasion. Even more worryingly for Chinese officials is the drastic decline in those self-identifying as Chinese.


After the end of the Chinese Civil War when upwards of a million fled to the island, the Taiwanese identity became almost inseparable from that of China. In fact, Chinese culture has been better preserved in Taiwan than on the mainland which was subject to communist purges and cultural cleansing. This meant that at the start of democratisation in 1989, 52% of those surveyed still identified as Chinese whilst only 16% of respondents said they were Taiwanese. 


This is no longer the case. Taiwan has formed an independent identity encompassing more liberal values including media freedom, democratic governance, and a focus on LGBT rights as evidenced in becoming the first country in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage. This has led to only 3% of Taiwanese still identifying as solely Chinese, a figure that falls to 1% for the 18-34 age group.  


So what are the implications for potential conflict? In short, not good. 


The Taiwanese people are clearly completely uninterested in the prospect of reunification with the mainland. They have their own identity and values, and an independence they strongly want to protect. 


However, for Xi Jinping reunification is a do or die policy. Something upon which he has bet much of his political legacy. An issue that, if left unresolved, threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the CCP’s nationalist-totalitarianism. 


Unfortunately this fundamentally gridlocked conflict seems to have only one possible outcome. 


The rhetoric from Chinese officials has changed, with the term ‘peaceful reunification’ being dropped from a recent government publication. China is also starting to make more overtly aggressive moves, such as holding frequent military drills over and around the island, which have torn up diplomatic precedents. It has also undergone a massive military modernisation programme, increasing its defence spending by more than 7.2% this year to more than double it under Xi. 


The whole situation seems to be heading in one catastrophic and dangerous direction. A potential nightmare for other countries in the region and a direct challenge to the liberal global order. 


Those countries in the West who profess to care so deeply about protecting global democratic values but still rely heavily in economic terms on China may soon be faced with a harsh reality. One in which they must choose between principles and prosperity.



Image: Chensiyuan/Wikimedia Commons

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