Masoud Pezeshkian has succeeded in becoming Iran’s newest president. 53.7% of the country rejected Saeed Jalili, the embodiment of hardline conservatism represented in Pezeshkian’s predecessor Ebrahim Raisi, in favour of the sole exponent of reform on the ballot. Having previously been disqualified from contesting parliamentary elections in 2021, this was no small achievement for Pezeshkian and, for many, it comes as something of a surprise.
The electorate seem ready and eager to start the “new chapter” that Pezeshkian claims he is writing for Iran. But does this victory really represent a shift in Iran’s political stances? Despite the veneer of political realignment, a more credible reading is that Iran’s international and domestic attitudes are unlikely to change anytime soon.
Pezeshkian, a cardiac surgeon before entering politics in 1997 as Deputy Health Minister, had seemingly breathed new life into Iranian politics. He had called for the end of Iranian isolationism, proposing “constructive negotiations” with the West, criticised the “cage” in which the Iranian government is kept, and argued for an end to internet restrictions. He raised eyebrows further with his critique of Iran’s hijab laws, his promotion of gender equality and, most recently, his support for Mahsa Amini, the 22-year-old Iranian woman who died in suspicious circumstances, having suffered a heart attack while being kept in an Iranian police station.
However, even before the results were announced by Iran’s Ministry of Interior, there was international exasperation that, regardless of the victor, real change would continue to elude Iran. Despite the Iranian Constitution stipulating that elections should be the “direct vote of the people”, and notwithstanding Pezeshkian’s campaign slogan “For Iran”, many Iranian voters feel that they have no choice in a system that is “riddled with coercion, manipulation, and inherent inequality”. In reality, ultimate control is exercised by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in his executive role as “the omnipotent overseer of Iran’s political scene”. Khamenei’s grip on power is tightened further by the Guardian Council, which vets all presidential candidates for loyalty to the regime, and by the military power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which dances to Khamenei’s tune.
Well aware of this, Iranians can hardly be blamed for viewing Pezeshkian as a ceremonial “lame-duck”, who is simply unable to address the core issues, and many seem convinced that the state’s electoral framework ensures deadlock. Indeed, the historically low turnout (the first round of voting saw 39.93% of Iranians vote, the lowest since the 1979 Revolution), continuing acts of civil disobedience, and the popularity of hashtags such as “#traitorousminority” and “#ElectionCircus” on Iranian social media, all indicate widespread electoral disaffection within Iran. For disenchanted Iranians, the occupant of their country’s second most important position wears a hollow crown.
That view is confirmed by domestic and international reactions to the result of the election. Consider, for example, the immediate response of Kamal Kharazi, senior advisor to Khamenei. He stated that the outcome would have no effect on Iranian foreign policy, which remained in the jurisdiction of the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations – a body independent from the President and entirely subject to the Ayatollah. Similarly, the United States State Department made clear that they expected no change in Iran’s geopolitical trajectory or international behaviour. Driving the point home, it restated that the United States had no plans to re-engage in nuclear talks with Iran and was “far from any meaningful diplomatic resolution”.
All this comes as no surprise to Iranians, and who can say that their pessimism is unfounded? Scenes of celebration in the aftermath of Pezeshkian’s victory should not be mistaken for anything other than a widespread expression of relief. His majority should not be interpreted as a naïve desire for change, but rather a damage limitation exercise. Iranians who did vote largely did so to avoid the tyranny of yet another ultraconservative at the helm. With his traditional views on the hijab and his isolationist attitude towards the West, Saeed Jalili would have almost certainly ushered in an even harsher domestic policy and the potential “Talibanisation” of Iran, rendering any hopes of international rapprochement impossible. At least with Pezeshkian nominally in charge, and with Khamenei’s health increasingly in question, Iranians can hope.
Image: khamenei.ir
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