For too long, Europe has slumbered under an American security blanket. Leaders have dozed, while threats have accumulated first on and then within the continent's borders. Now, Donald Trump's return to the White House threatens the rudest of awakenings. His first term saw NATO's foundations shaken by repeated disparagements and casual threats of funding withdrawal. His second may shatter the bloc entirely. The European Union, hamstrung by bureaucratic sclerosis and the absence of the United Kingdom, appears unable to fill the void. With war raging in Ukraine and an emboldened Russia eyeing the Baltics with increasing appetite, Europe must look beyond both NATO and the EU towards a muscular framework for defence cooperation among its most capable and committed nations.
The extent of Europe’s dependence on America is strikingly clear. The US spends 42% more on defence as a proportion of GDP than EU member states as a whole do, predominating in air power, naval operations, logistics, and rapid deployment capabilities. Trump's encouragement of potential Russian aggression against NATO allies, who fail to meet the alliance's 2% GDP target gives the game away. The purpose of NATO is to present such a formidable united front that enemy attack becomes unthinkable. Absent this, the alliance becomes not merely pointless, but actively dangerous. Crucially, any new framework would not supersede Article 5 commitments, but rather ensure their credibility through European capability.
The European Union's defence ambitions offer no viable alternative. Member states remain divided over questions of strategic priority, while the bloc's byzantine decision-making apparatus proves ill-suited to managing military crises. Granting a veto to compromised democracies, like Hungary, hardly seems a recipe for defending Europe against autocracy. Most crucially, one of Europe’s two nuclear powers — Britain — remains disengaged from the bloc since Brexit. Even with a more pro-European government in London, the UK is unlikely to participate fully in any EU-based defence framework.
Any new framework must prioritise operational effectiveness over political wrangling. Its core should consist of European nations firmly committed to liberal democracy and economically capable of defending the continent’s eastern flank.
Chief among these would be Britain, France, Germany, and Poland, with likely support from Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic states. This arrangement demands a radical departure from existing models of European cooperation. Rather than seeking consensus among dozens of states, decision-making would rest with a streamlined council of core members, operating by qualified majority vote. Smaller nations could participate as associate members—contributing specialised capabilities in areas such as cyber-defence or intelligence gathering—without wielding a veto over operational decisions.
The industrial implications require delicate handling. Europe's defence sector remains fragmented, with multiple competing programmes producing similar capabilities at inflated cost. While consolidation through joint procurement might threaten some national industrial bases in the short term, the alternative - maintaining small-scale defence industries that produce overpriced and mutually incompatible equipment - poses a greater threat to European security. Strategic subsidies and workshare arrangements could ease the transition, ensuring key sovereign capabilities remain distributed across participating nations.
Implementation requires immediate action on three fronts:
the establishment of a standing rapid reaction force with organic air support;
the creation of a defence investment fund, financed through GDP-weighted contributions;
the initiation of regular large-scale exercises in Eastern Europe, demonstrating the alliance's ability to deploy and sustain significant combat power along NATO's eastern flank.
Critics will inevitably claim such an arrangement undermines NATO. Yet the alliance's credibility already lies in tatters, shredded by American ambivalence and internal discord. A European security framework would complement rather than compete with NATO, providing insurance against American withdrawal while demonstrating to Washington that Europe can shoulder its share of the defensive burden. Indeed, a more capable Europe might prove the surest way to maintain American engagement, replacing dependency with partnership.
The domestic political challenge too appears formidable. European populations, long accustomed to American subsidy of their defence, may balk at increased military spending. Defence has become more important to electorates since the outbreak of the War in Ukraine, but those who want to ramp up spending remain in the minority. In particular, Germany’s reticence towards perceived militarism has proven a barrier to solving the continent’s defensive woes. However, a new government will arrive in February. It would be likely headed up by the CDU’s (Germany’s mainstream right-wing party) Friedrich Merz, who seems much more awake to the need for radical action than the incumbent — Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Change will only come, if leaders are willing to make the case and act ahead of public opinion. The key lies in presenting enhanced European defence capability not as militarisation, but as insurance. Higher defence spending is the price of maintaining peace.
The hour grows late. Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression is fraying. Europe can no longer afford to defer the question of strategic autonomy. This goes beyond a contingency against American withdrawal and represents something greater than a mere evolution in European strategic thinking. Europe’s major powers need to prove that democracies will still stand up for themselves and each other, even as the largest of their peers flirts with authoritarianism at home. After decades of lethargy, Europe must finally awaken to the imperative of self-defence.
Image: Defense Visual Information Distribution Service/Staff Sgt. Jaccob Hearn
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