Dr. Vesna Skare Ozbolt, 10th Minister of Justice of Croatia (2003-2006) and Adviser to the President of Croatia (1991-1999)
In 2024, the familiar mantra was repeated that the Western Balkan countries, most of which emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia, plus Albania, are part of Europe and should be admitted anon to the European club. Only Croatia, in 2013, has taken this step. The other six countries—Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania—are currently at various stages of accession and have been working for years, if not decades, to secure a concrete date for EU membership.
2024 was a high profile year for the Western Balkans, as geopolitics and elections at all levels brought international eyes to the region time and again. The elections, however, did not bring any significant material or atmospheric changes to the political landscape of the Western Balkans.
According to Securimeter, presented by the Regional Cooperation Council in Tirana, only 39% of citizens believe that the Western Balkans is a safe place to live. Population loss due to emigration is the main problem for most Western Balkan countries. Corruption is widespread. The issue of gender safety has also come to the forefront, as domestic violence and sexual harassment represent a growing concern, except perhaps in Montenegro, where the influence of pro-Serbian politics has strengthened.
In 2024, Serbia has positioned and branded itself in regional and international relations as the linchpin without whose involvement there can be no regional peace and stability. Visits from world statesmen have confirmed Serbia's central position. In recent months, Serbia has been visited by inter alia Chinese President Xi Jinping, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and French President Emmanuel Macron. In effect, without Serbia, no primary issue in the Western Balkans can be resolved. EXPO and Serbia’s warming to BRICS will push it further into the geopolitical focus and East-West tug of war.
Military analysts have noted that out of all the countries in the Western Balkans and neighbouring regions, only two countries are seriously rearming: Croatia and Serbia. Croatia is doing so because it must meet NATO's defense spending criteria of 2% of GDP. For Serbia, it is unclear why it is rearming and who poses a threat to it.
Croatian Defense Minister Anušić stated that Croatia will reach the target of spending 2% of GDP on defense in the next few years, and that the military budget is increasing every year. "It is not something that can be done overnight; it involves huge amounts of money, but Croatia has increased total spending on the modernization and equipping of the armed forces by 122% from 2016 to today," Minister Anušić emphasized.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, responding to statements by Bosnian military analyst Nedžad Ahatović, who said that Serbia's rearmament poses a threat to the region and that Serbia is "playing the role of a small Russia" aiming to unite the Serbian world in the region, Vučić replied that such comments are the result of some people's discomfort with the fact that Serbia's economy now represents half of the total economy of the Western Balkans. He stated that Serbia is rearming to protect itself, not to threaten anyone in the region. He pointed out that comments about Serbia's rearmament being a threat to peace in the region are "mantras from those who can never be satisfied until Serbia is small enough and sufficiently humiliated." He emphasized, "When Serbia rearmaments, it does so primarily from its domestic industry. It arms itself to protect its name, its surname, to protect its sky, its land. So that various dwarfs do not think they can once again take its territory, as they have done many times in the past. And Serbia has never endangered anyone in any way," Vučić stated.
In early June 2024, Vučić led the "General Serbian Assembly" in Belgrade with representatives of Serbs from all parts of the former Yugoslavia – a strategic meeting that essentially outlined the plan for implementing the "Serbian World" within the "General Serbian Declaration." Kosovo is mentioned as part of Serbia, and the Republic of Srpska is described as a "national interest of Serbia." A spokesperson for the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin condemned this unusually sharply. The German government considers the General Serbian Declaration to be "very concerning and harmful for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for Serbia and all the countries of the Western Balkans."
Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denis Bećirović, commented on the Belgrade gathering in his address to the United Nations as follows: "The destructive declaration of the so-called General Serbian Assembly, adopted on June 8th of this year in Belgrade, [...] is not just a declarative act, but a dangerous state document."
None of the neighbouring countries targeted by Belgrade's territorial claims have armed forces ‘ready for war’. Without the protection of two Western peace missions, NATO in Kosovo (KFOR) and the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR/Althea), they would be easy targets for Belgrade's aggressive expansionism. In recent years, several demonstrations of Serbian troops on the border with Kosovo and an attack by a Serbian paramilitary unit on Kosovo's security forces have caused unrest. These incidents may have been a test by Belgrade. However, since the responses from the U.S. and NATO were swift and sharp, Serbia backed off. In August 2024, Washington intervened again, this time with CIA Director William Burns, who came to Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically to stop the separatist actions of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik. Dodik has repeatedly initiated steps toward declaring the independence of the Republic of Srpska and has armed thousands of members of paramilitary units. Politicians in the capital, Sarajevo, are preparing for the possibility of the Republic of Srpska attempting secession. If armed conflict occurs and Bosnian Serbs come under military pressure, it is very likely that Belgrade could send its tanks to Bosnia and Herzegovina to save them.
Vučić's increased arming of Serbia must be viewed in the light of growing dissatisfaction with the ruling policies in Serbia. Protests, which began due to dissatisfaction with the investigation in Novi Sad after the bridge collapse at the train station that killed 14 people, have spread throughout the country. The leaders of the protests against the government are students and young people who want a change in Serbia’s leadership and the removal of President Vučić and his government. The main reasons stated are corruption, nepotism, media freedom, and the protection of human rights.
2024 was marked by tensions and conflicts between Serbia and Kosovo, primarily due to military exercises conducted by Serbia near the Kosovo border, as well as clashes with police forces in Zvečan and Zubin Potok. Tensions remain due to the Serbian population living in those areas, which, with the encouragement and assistance of Belgrade, is resisting Kosovar authorities. In northern Kosovo, the number of KFOR units has increased, heralding the possibility of conflict escalation, potentially up to a new armed confrontation initiated by Serbia against Kosovo.
Bosnia and Herzegovina bids farewell to 2024 as another year of missed opportunities for the lasting stabilization of political and social relations, even though the ruling coalition had promised accelerated reforms and progress towards EU membership at the beginning of the year. EU membership was, in fact, the only unifying element of the diverse ruling coalition. In a country still deeply divided by visible administrative, and invisible ethnic, borders, its inhabitants continue to have discordant visions for the future, yet a majority still wants Bosnia and Herzegovina to follow a path of European integration. However, signs of such progress are few and far between, as the country has once again been overwhelmed by old political conflicts.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2024 was marked by two significant legal processes. In January, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced the former Prime Minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fadil Novalić (SDA), to four years in prison for abuse of office and authority related to the procurement of ventilators during the coronavirus pandemic. In February, the same court began the trial of the President of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, on charges of failing to comply with the decisions of the High Representative Schmidt.
The trial of these two is an attempt to prove that the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be effective and prosecute high-ranking officials when they break the law. The outcome of the trial against Dodik, which is expected in 2025, could determine the fate of this long-standing undisputed leader of Bosnian Serbs, as a conviction in his case would effect a dismissal from the Presidency.
Although the UN resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica has once again stirred emotions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly among Serbs in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbia, the coming year will undoubtedly be challenging, as July 2025 will mark the 30th anniversary of the genocide committed in Srebrenica.
Equally, in November 2025, three decades will have passed since the initialing of the Dayton Agreement, which forms the basis of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, and whose survival is guaranteed by the most important Western countries, which are also witnesses to the agreement.
The Dayton Agreement, which stopped the war in Bosnia & Herzegovina, is outdated, creating political and security instability, weighing on future reforms, and lessening progress towards EU and NATO integration. The Dayton Agreement should be replaced with a treaty which, preserving its finer attributes, charts a clear path for Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop into a stable and peaceful European state.
For Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of electoral reform remains important and must be implemented in the coming year, considering that general elections are planned for 2026, and the electoral law should not be changed in that year.
Montenegro’s 2024 was brightened when it received a positive report from the European Union regarding the fulfillment of some membership criteria, and darkened when the actions of pro-Serbian right-wing forces strained its relations with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Montenegro remains geopolitically precarious, oscillating between pro-Western aspirations and traditional Serbian-Russian influence.
Pro-Serbian interests and influences in Montenegro are increasingly strengthening. There is also an as yet untapped nuclear option, being that 200,000 Serbian citizens could acquire Montenegrin citizenship, which could ultimately lead to the "democratic suffocation" of Montenegrin identity and the state of Montenegro, population 633,000.
Montenegro’s developments in 2024 underscored its strategic importance within the Western Balkans and beyond. Its role as a NATO member, EU candidate country, and participant in regional initiatives showcased its potential as both a partner in stabilizing the Balkans and a nation grappling with its geopolitical identity. How Montenegro addresses these internal and external pressures will be pivotal for its future in the region.
Albania continued its efforts to strengthen democracy and governance in 2024. The ruling Socialist Party focused on institutional reforms to align with EU accession requirements, particularly in areas of judicial integrity and anti-corruption measures. As for economics, infrastructure investments were performed under the EU-funded Connectivity Agenda for the Western Balkans, including upgrades to major roads and ports, which fuelled this year’s growth. Albania hosted the Berlin Process Summit last year which shows Prime Minister Edi Rama’s commitment to EU integration and cooperation, supported by the Crown Prince Leka of Albania. In that sense, Albania’s position as a reliable EU and NATO partner has only strengthened.
Although the Western Balkans is surrounded by EU countries making it somewhat of an enclave, full membership in the EU remains an unattainable dream. Membership is being refused due to low living standards, questionable democratic conditions, and sensitive national conflicts between them. This has led to great frustration in the Balkan countries—especially since Ukraine and Moldova, in record time, became candidates for EU accession. Croatian President Milanović stated that in parts of the EU, especially in the West, "there is a deep reservation" regarding the EU path of the Western Balkans. A clear indicator of this, according to the Croatian president, was the EU's decision in June, when Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status, but Bosnia and Herzegovina was not. "I consider that a moral disaster," said President Milanović, repeating that he, "if he had been in the position of the Croatian representative" in the European Council, would have conditioned the candidate status of the two Eastern Partnership countries on granting candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. "Suddenly, Ukraine can, but Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot. An organization that conducts its foreign and regional policy in such a way is not on the right path," concluded President Milanović.
One thing is certain: the EU is not ready for the Western Balkans, because as long as the principle of unanimous decision-making prevails, no one will expand the number of members from 27 to 33 by accepting new, problematic members. And so, we arrive at a vicious circle, creating space for the expansion of Russia's sphere of influence. This situation cannot endure without leading to further deterioration.
It remains to be seen whether the new U.S. administration will continue where Trump left off, which included, among other things, proposals for changing borders, or if, in order to achieve their geopolitical goals in the Western Balkans, they will need to find an alternative to the failed EU enlargement policy.
For these reasons, the Western Balkans must soon, and collectively, leap forward. Some form of privileged partnership with participation in the common market as an intermediate stage towards full membership, without voting rights or full decision-making power in the EU, would be a start. It would certainly jolt the Western Balkans out of its deadlock.
The Western Balkans region enters 2025 with many unresolved issues and challenges. Geopolitical intrigue, internal reforms and machinations, and security problems define the complex picture. Without new momentum from the EU and the U.S., the region will continue to balance between progress and stagnation, with the risk of further deterioration in current tensions.
Image: European Union
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